Battle Over Britain

The Battle of Britain marked the end of an era, both for the Royal Air Force and for the United Kingdom as a whole. It finally ushered out the centuries-old doctrine which held that while the high seas were dominated by the Royal Navy, Great Britain herself could remain aloof, secure from any threat which might arise on the Imperial boundaries. Even the scattered bombing of London during the late stages of the First World War had not finally disposed of this myth, although clearly pointing the way for the future conduct of war, for those who had eyes to see. The Battle was to demonstrate, once and for all, that in the age of the heavy bomber the whole nation was in the front line.
The Battle also spelt the end of the Air Force conceived by Lord Trenchard, despite the fact that it was for precisely this type of campaign that it had been prepared over twenty years.
For too long this preparation had progressed in the belief that individual gallantry and style would compensate for numerical weakness and lack of up-to-date equipment, with the result that the Royal Air Force had come to revel in the atmosphere of an elite club. When faced by the reality of the Luftwaffe, a highly dedicated and professional machine of war, these exaggerated qualities of individualism and confidence were necessarily subordinated to the desperate needs of the moment. The traditional attitudes of the Service helped to nerve Fighter Command to withstand the appalling pressures of the summer of 1940; but when the Battle was over the pre-war character of that Command had disappeared for ever, and with it died many of the officers and men who had played a central part in the growth of the Royal Air Force to maturity.
The Luftwaffe paid a similar price. The planning of an aerial campaign against Britain had been so neglected, and the Intelligence groundwork proved to be so inadequate, that German conduct of the Battle deteriorated into a series of unpremeditated expedients rather than a tightly structured sequence of initiatives.
The inadequate direction of the campaign at the highest level of command took a toll not only in the lives of trained airmen, but in the morale and confidence of the most able and far-sighted junior commanders in the field.
This book describes, in unprecedented detail, the sequence of events which led up to and constituted the Battle of Britain and the opening of the night Blitz; it is founded on years of research into primary sources, rather than an amplification of the now-familiar "official" history—which has perpetuated for too long a series of assumptions now shown to be completely inaccurate. The story is told through the unfolding of events as they occurred, with an emphasis on decisions taken and actions performed in the light of contemporary knowledge and capability.
The Battle owed much to the early sporadic raids on England in 1917 and 1918, for these provided practical indications of the difficulties involved in effectively attacking and defending an island whose vital industries lay beyond the range of anything but a long-range strategic bomber force. But one of the central questions remained unanswered until that extraordinary summer began. Who could foretell how the civilian population would stand up under this new and terrifying ordeal ? At what point would the nerve of the nation break, opening the gates of panic evacuation, disorder, epidemic, and even capitulation? The lessons of Warsaw and Rotterdam tended to confirm the fears of the prophets of the 1930s—that there was no adequate defence against the bomber .. .
The Battle of Britain was the first decisive campaign ever fought exclusively by air forces, and the stakes at risk were suitably cataclysmic. The protagonists were the most powerful tyrant the world had ever seen, and the last free nation bearing arms against him. The outcome would fundamentally effect the course of history; and the responsibility for that outcome would rest, in the final analysis, upon just 3,080 men.


by F. K. Mason
Published by Alban Books/McWhirter Twins 1969 1st edition. 636pp profusely ilustrated, appendices, bibliography, maps on end papers, very good in spine faded d/j.






Note:
"Long" descriptions, where shown, may have been taken from the book's dust jacket notes, and as such are relevant to the date of publication (e.g. any references to "previously unpublished photographs" etc.) and not the present.